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Opening Argument: Should Foreign Law Be Used to Interpret Our Constitution?
National Journal
March 6, 2004
Stuart Taylor, Jr.
Practitioners of the loosey-goosey approach
to constitutional interpretation that maddens
original-meaning conservatives such as
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia are
increasingly looking to a virtually unlimited
source of new raw material: foreign law,
including international human-rights
conventions, Zimbabwe Supreme Court
rulings, and whatever else might come in
handy. Indeed, two of the more
internationalist justices, Sandra Day
O'Connor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have
confidently predicted that (in O'Connor's
words) the justices "will find ourselves
looking more frequently to the decisions of
other constitutional courts."
The most publicized example has been
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's majority
opinion last June in Lawrence v. Texas,
striking down all state laws that made gay
sex a crime. In expanding the "liberty"
protected by the 14th Amendment's due
process clause, Kennedy cited (among other
things) a British Parliament vote in 1967
repealing laws against homosexual acts and
a European Court of Human Rights decision
in 1981 that such laws violated the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Scalia grumped in dissent that Kennedy had
ignored "the many countries that have
retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy."
He also invoked Justice Clarence Thomas's
assertion in a previous case that the Court
"should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans."
But Kennedy had a plausible reason for
looking abroad: The late Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger's concurrence in Bowers
v. Hardwick, the 1986 decision that
Lawrence overruled, had claimed that
homosexual conduct had been outlawed
"throughout the history of Western
civilization." It was fair game for Kennedy
to point out some recent history pointing in
the opposite direction.
More troubling, in my view, was a 2002
decision (Atkins v. Virginia) that said
imposing the death sentence on a mentally
retarded murderer violated the Eighth
Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishments," in part because such
sentences are "overwhelmingly
disapproved" by "the world community."
This assertion - which Justice John Paul
Stevens based on a single brief by the
European Union in another case - was a
transparent effort to compensate for the fact
that the "national consensus" that Stevens
purported to discern against executing
retarded criminals simply did not exist: The
laws of 20 of the 38 capital-punishment
states still allowed such executions.
Also troubling was Ginsburg's concurrence
in another June 2003 decision, Grutter v.
Bollinger, which upheld the use of racial
preferences in university admissions. Joined
by Ju stice S tephen B reyer, Ginsburg b egan
by noting with approval that the
International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
allows the theoretically temporary
"maintenance of unequal or separate rights
for d ifferent racial g roups" - a regime that
Ginsburg suggested should continue for
decades. Then she cited analogous
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provisions of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which - Ginsburg noted in
a speech a few weeks later - "sadly, the
United States has not ratified."
If an international agreement that the United
States has refused to ratify can be invoked as
a guide to the meaning of the 136-year-old
14th Amendment, what will be next?
Constitutional interpretation based on the
sayings of Chairman Mao? Or Barbra
Streisand?
In addition to importing foreign law to
resolve purely domestic cases, Ginsburg
suggested in the same speech that she wants
to apply the Bill of Rights extraterritorially
and enforce the "rights of any human
being," anywhere in the world, in cases
involving the U.S. government. She did not
say whether she would carry this to the point
of ordering U.S. forces overseas to give
Miranda warnings to the likes of Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, the suspected
mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, who was
captured in Pakistan last March.
One of the charms of foreign law is that
there is so much to choose from. In a 1999
dissent suggesting that a death sentence
should be struck down because of a delay of
more than 20 years in executing the
condemned man (Knight v. Florida), Breyer
cited as " useful, even though n ot b inding,"
the views of the supreme courts of
Zimbabwe and India, as well as the
European Court of Human Rights. To be
sure, the Supreme Court of Canada and the
U.N. Human Rights Committee had reached
the opposite conclusion. But Breyer knew
which conclusion he liked.
In future c ases, p erhaps, j ustices who want
to narrow the First Amendment's guarantee
of religious freedom may cite France's
recent legislation banning all students from
wearing religious symbols in public schools,
the main purpose of which was to strip
Muslim girls of their head scarves. And the
Netherlands will come in handy for any
justices who want to declare a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage, assisted suicide,
recreational marijuana, or prostitution.
For believers in the originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation, the only
question in such cases should be "the
understanding oft he r atifiers oft he B ill of
Rights in 1791 [and of other constitutional
provisions], not the current views of foreign
nations," in the words of Robert H. Bork in
his 2003 book, Coercing Virtue: The
Worldwide Rule of Judges. To Bork, the
foreign-law fad is simply another gambit by
a Court that is determined to act as a
continuing constitutional convention.
Conservatives are not alone in worrying
about the dangers to our democracy of
importing laws and constitutional principles
crafted by intellectual elites abroad. "Since
World War II, much of 'old' Europe has
been pursuing an anti-national, anti-
democratic world constitutionalism that, for
all its idealism and achievements, is
irreconcilable with America's commitment
to democratic self-government," writes
professor Jed Rubenfeld, of Yale Law
School, in the Wilson Quarterly. Rubenfeld
adds, "When the international community
throws down the gauntlet over the death
penalty in America while merely clearing its
throat about the slaughter in Yugoslavia,
Americans can hardly be blamed if they see
a sign that an anti-American agenda can be
expected to find expression in international
law."
But while i t's fun to mock t he excesses of
judicial one-worldism, and while it's
important to guard against the anti-
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democratic drift of such thinking, the trend
is not all bad.
For starters, the notion of constitutional
interpretation as a purely historical inquiry
into the Framers' intentions has been pretty
thoroughly buried, for a long time, by the
Supreme Court and the vast majority of
legal scholars. Almost everybody, including
Bork and Scalia, supports judicial
"interpretations" that are really revisions of
the Constitution in at least some cases. For
better or worse, extratextual and a historical
methods of discerning (or inventing)
constitutional principles and values are the
norm, not the exception.
This should not be carried to the point of
imposing upon Americans the principles and
values of other nations, as the Court did in
Atkins. But within reasonable bounds,
Supreme Court citations of foreign law can
serve at least three worthwhile purposes:
shedding empirical light on what might be
the real-world impact of a decision
following a foreign court's approach to a
common problem; enhancing the
persuasiveness of the Court's opinions to
those who see international consensus as a
badge of legitimacy; and displaying what
Thomas Jefferson called "a decent respect to
the opinions of mankind," a phrase regularly
invoked by judicial internationalists.
Most of the justices regularly travel abroad
and hobnob at conferences with judges,
lawyers, and professors from around the
world. And they regularly hear complaints
like the one by a prominent London
barrister, who asserted at a 2000 American
Bar Association convention in London that
"your system is quite certain it has nothing
to learn from us," because the U.S. Supreme
Court so rarely takes account of European
court decisions.
Bork dismisses such complaints in his book
as "insolent foreign browbeating." But there
is more to them than that. We have long held
out our own Constitution and our
independent judiciary as models for other
nations. Many of these nations have
followed our example so enthusiastically
that their judges regularly cite our Supreme
Court's decisions as guides to interpretation
of their own constitutions. It is
understandable that they should expect
American justices and judges to return the
compliment, at least by giving respectful
consideration to their constitutional
decisions even when our own Constitution
requires different answers.
At a time of unprecedented fear and
resentment of the United States around the
globe, we d esperately need a11 t he help w e
can get in the war against terrorism. That
alone is a good reason for the Court to take
pains to show respect not only for the rule of
law but also for the work of foreign and
international courts. It should, in the words
of Justice Ginsburg, display "a spirit of
humility" vis-a-vis world opinion. But it
should display more humility vis-a-vis the
American electorate too.
224
Don't Gag U.S. Courts
The National Law Journal
August 23, 2003
Martha F. Davis
One of the profound lessons of Sept. 11,
2001, is that isolationism is dangerous-not
only because it exacerbates potential threats
from outside our borders, but because it
excludes sources of ideas and support from
other nations that can bolster U.S. efforts
internationally and domestically.
Unfortunately, this lesson seems to have
been lost on many in Congress. Instead,
efforts are under way to impose House
Resolution 568, a 'gag order' on the federal
courts, which discourages judges from
looking at foreign or international
precedents. After a favorable vote by the
Constitution Subcommittee, the resolution,
which has 74 co-sponsors, is now pending
before the full House Judiciary Committee.
If it goes forward, the resolution could have
an immediate impact on the U.S. Supreme
Court, which will hear arguments on Oct. 13
in Roper v. Simmons, a constitutional
challenge to the juvenile death penalty. The
Missouri Supreme Court decision in Roper
relied in part on international human rights
law to support striking down the law that
permitted juvenile executions.
The U.S. Supreme Court has begun to
embrace international dialogue on a range of
issues. For many years, individual justices
have noted the importance of learning from
other nations. In particular, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor has urged U.S. judges to
draw on decisions of the European Court of
Justice, while justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer have championed the
relevance of international legal materials.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice
Anthony Kennedy have also noted in
speeches and writings the importance of
looking to international and comparative law
for inspiration.
In 2003, these individual voices came
together in several constitutional decisions,
including Lawrence v. Texas and Grutter v.
University of Michigan. In Lawrence, the
majority cited both the laws of other nations
and international human rights law as bases
for comparison with U.S. precedents. In
Grutter, Ginsburg's concurrence made
specific reference to international practices
of affirmative action.
An International Dialogue
With these references, the court entered into
a dialogue of ideas with its counterparts
around the world. The Supreme Court of
Canada, the supreme courts of I ndia, I srael
and South Africa, the European Court of
Justice and many other high courts have
strong traditions of looking to U.S.
precedents as they shape their own domestic
law.
Now U.S. courts have started to respond.
But rather than the wholesale adoption of
other nations' approaches to, for example,
gay rights, the U.S. Supreme Court drew on
our own domestic legal precedents while
acknowledging the parallel processes and
various outcomes in other nations with
similar legal traditions and standards. This
fruitful approach ensures that Supreme
Court decisions canvas the best ideas and
approaches available, while also engaging
the judicial branch in the sort of
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international human rights dialogue that-if
conducted universally and responsibly might
ultimately help prevent the conditions that
give rise to terrorist acts.
House Resolution 568 raises a number of
serious issues, not the least of which is
Congress' overreaching attempt to influence
judicial decision-making. A gag order that
discourages the judicial branch from looking
at international practices, and citing those
practices where relevant, strikes at the heart
of an independent judiciary.
The resolution also represents a dangerous
extension of the executive branch's
isolationist foreign policy to international
ideas themselves. Courts and judges, after
all, trade in ideas. The resolution attempts to
bar consideration of a whole range of ideas
simply because of their source in foreign or
international law. Ironically, it is the
resolution itself that is fundamentally at
odds with the American values of free
expression and reasoned debate. While the
House resolution has no binding effect on
the judiciary, its potential to chill the
judiciary is clear. Judicial nominees can
expect that this issue will become the next
confirmation hot button, and they may feel
pressured to succumb to an isolationist
ideology. Judges with life tenure may feel
constrained by fears of censure or even
impeachment.
The human rights dialogue initiated by the
federal courts is a healthy exchange of ideas
that can lead to better judicial decisions here
and, in the end, a deeper understanding of
human rights worldwide. Faced with the
ongoing terrorist threat, Congress surely has
better things to do than inject isolationist
politics into the federal judiciary.
Martha F. Davis is an associate professor at
Northeastern University School of Law. She
is the recipient of a 2003-2004 Soros
Reproductive Health and Rights Fellowship.
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Thinking Outside the U.S.
The Washington Post
August 4, 2003
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court is going global - and
not just in the sense that several of the
justices have embarked on their annual
summer voyages to European destinations.
Rather, the Court's own decision-making is
beginning to reflect the influence of
international legal norms, as well as rulings
by courts in foreign countries.
The trend peaked in the two most important
cases of the recently completed term - the
court's rulings permitting race-conscious
admissions in higher education and
abolishing state prohibitions on private,
consensual homosexual conduct.
In both cases, justices invoked legal
principles that were not made exclusively in
the United States.
In the affirmative action case, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote for a 5-to-4 majority
that the University of Michigan Law
School's effort to enroll a "critical mass" of
black, Latino and Native American
applicants could pass muster under the U.S.
Constitution - though such programs might
not be necessary 25 years from now. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate
concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Stephen G. Breyer, that noted that the
court's 25-year time frame was consistent
with the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, ratified by the United States
in 1994, but that it should not be considered
a firm forecast.
More decisively, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy buttressed his majority opinion in
the homosexual conduct case by noting that
the court's past approval of state sodomy
bans was o ut o f s tep with the I aw i n other
Western democracies. Citing opinions of
the European Court of Human Rights, he
wrote that "the right the petitioners seek in
this case has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other
countries."
The court's consideration of international
perspectives was a breakthrough for the
"transnational" legal perspective, which,
advocates say, recognizes that the United
States - historically an innovator in
constitutional adjudication - now has much
to learn from the rapidly developing
constitutional traditions of other
democracies.
"Human rights progress is not the same in
every part of the world at the same time,"
said Harold Hongju Koh, a professor of
international law at Yale who served as
assistant secretary of state for democracy,
human rights and labor in the Clinton
administration. "In the U.S., we're ahead on
some issues, but behind on others, such as
the death penalty, gay rights and
immigrants' rights."
Koh noted that the Court's 2002 ruling
banning the death penalty for mentally
retarded criminals also invoked international
opinion. In explaining why that practice
violated contemporary notions of
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permissible punishment, Justice John Paul
Stevens writing for a 6-to-3 majority, said
that "within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved." Stevens
attributed this observation to a friend-of-the-
court brief filed by the European Union.
This approach. is not without its critics,
however, and some of the sharpest
criticism has come from within the court
itself, especially from Justice Antonin
Scalia.
Responding to Stevens in the death penalty
case, Scalia sardonically awarded Stevens's
reference to the "world community" a "Prize
for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to
fabricate 'national consensus.' "
Citing his own words from one of the
court's previous death penalty cases, Scalia
wrote: "We must never forget that it is a
Constitution for the United States of
America that we are expounding. . . .
[W]here there is not first a settled consensus
among our own people, the views of other
nations, however enlightened the Justices of
this Court may think them to be, cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution."
Scalia's view is supported by conservative
legal scholars who regard the court's use of
international legal sources as an
intellectually amorphous endeavor that
would subject U.S. citizens to the decisions
of foreign legal institutions. "When the court
starts taking things like that into account, it
reveals itself as more interested in making
policy than interpreting the fixed texts of the
Constitution or statutes," said John C. Yoo,
a former Bush administration adviser on
international law, who teaches law at the
University of California at Berkeley.
Koh and Yoo agree on one thing: Both said
that the justices' interest in international law
has probably been influenced by meetings
with fellow jurists on their frequent visits
abroad.
"Today, the justices are traveling much
more than they once did," Koh said. "And
when they go overseas, the question they are
asked is, 'How does your jurisprudence fit in
with that of other countries?'
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Foreign Exchange: Should the Supreme Court Care What Other Countries Think?
Slate
April 9, 2004
Tim Wu
Last week Justice Antonin Scalia did
something rather brave-at least in
Washington terms: He gave a speech to
people who disagree with him. The Supreme
Court justice told more than 1,000
international lawyers-members of the
American Society of International Law-
something they didn't want to hear. He
argued that the discussion of foreign cases in
U.S. constitutional opinions is
"wrong," perhaps even unconstitutional. No
surprise that Anne-Marie Slaughter,
president of the society, was quick to
promise "a response."
The Scalia showdown illuminates a festering
dispute that's fast becoming the court's own
transatlantic divide: When is it appropriate
for the Supreme Court to discuss foreign
legal materials? And while Scalia's answer
is "nearly never," other members of the
court see comparative constitutionalism as
enriching and uplifting. To a court already
divided along every ideological position
imaginable, add judicial foreign policy as
the latest fault line.
Scalia is not alone: His jeremiads on the
subject have inspired something of a
Republican crusade. House Republicans
reacted angrily to last spring's Lawrence v.
Texas, a decision that not only struck down
a b an o n h omosexual sodomy b ut also h ad
the nerve to cite a European case in the
process. They began peppering their
speeches with comments like "The
American people have not consented to
being ruled by foreign powers or tribunals."
And Tom Feeney, the representative from
Florida who made that particular remark, is
co-sponsor of an antiforeign-law resolution
titled the "Reaffirmation of American
Independence." Justices who ignore the
resolution, he says, "may subject themselves
to the ultimate remedy, which would be
impeachment." The Web site Conservative
Alerts agitates in similar fashion: " 'No
More' to these 'internationalist' Supreme
Court Justices," it says, "they could be
IMPEACHED for favoring OTHER
countries' laws instead of the U.S.
Constitution."
Legal "comparativism" in the Supreme
Court is staging a comeback. In Atkins v.
Virginia, the 2002 decision in which the
court barred the execution of the mentally
retarded, the following sentence appeared in
Justice Steven's opinion: "Within the world
community, the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved." And Lawrence, last year's
sodomy decision, also used foreign
materials, albeit to refute international
claims made in an earlier case. In 1986,
then-Chief Justice Warren Burger (a great
xenophile) had argued in Bowers v
Hardwick that bans on gay sex were "firmly
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards." In Lawrence, Justice Anthony
Kennedy pointed out that whatever ancient
practice might have been, England in
particular (perhaps under the influence of
David Beckham) and Europe in general had
changed their minds. Even the current chief
justice, William Rehnquist, has dabbled in
comparativism-discussing the Dutch
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experience in the course of rejecting a right
to assisted suicide in 1997's Washington v.
Glucksburg.
It's become a bit of a Punch and Judy show:
Just about every time the court cites foreign
materials, Scalia and/or Clarence Thomas
dissent. In the words of Scalia, "The views
of other nations, however enlightened the
Justices of this Court may think them to be,
cannot be imposed upon Americans through
the Constitution." Or, to quote Thomas on
the subject, "This court should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans."
Contemporary objections to the use of
foreign precedent have a long pedigree in
American politics: There's always been a
simmering fear of foreigners tainting our
leaders. In the 1790s, John Adams and
Thomas Jefferson were accused of being
more English or French than American,
respectively, after spending time abroad.
Today, the fear is that Sandra Day O'Connor
or Anthony Kennedy-after one too many
global judicial conferences-will go the way
of Justice Stephen Breyer and become
hopelessly intoxicated by foreign ways.
Part of what Scalia says is undeniably
correct. There is such a thing as the misuse,
and e ven t he i legal u se, o f foreign I aw b y
American courts. Were the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals to announce a legal
obligation to obey the European Court of
Human Rights, most (though not all)
international lawyers would join the crowds
storming the Bastille. But the Supreme
Court simply hasn't done that: It has not
deferred to or followed foreign cases in
statutory or constitutional c ases. Scalia and
the House Republicans, for effect really, are
mixing up the difference between listening
to foreign ideas and obeying foreign
commands. Scalia is like the prohibitionist
who confuses drinking with alcoholism. His
narrowly correct point stigmatizes a range of
reasonable, indeed salutary, judicial
behavior.
Everyone on the Supreme Court (including
Scalia) agrees that foreign law is relevant-
if not vital-to the international-law cases
that land in U.S. courts. Treaties, for
example, are somewhat like a contract
between nations and therefore joint projects.
The use of foreign law to help ascertain a
treaty's meaning is uncontroversial.
Similarly, there is simply nothing
constitutionally suspect about the under-
recognized "judicial shout-out." Judges are
not unlike rappers and bloggers: They like to
pay their respects. Rapper 50 Cent in Ghetto
Quran Lyrics offers:
Shout out to Clanvis and Clutch, Bob
Dre, Black Will If the flow don't kill
you the Mac will.
Which is pretty much the same thing Justice
Breyer does in the 2000 case Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government:
The approach taken by these cases is
consistent with that of other
constitutional courts facing similarly
complex constitutional problems
[after which he cites European and
Canadian Courts].
Both stanzas are basically meaningless as a
legal or lyrical matter, but both pay respect.
For Justice O'Connor this is what matters
most about citing foreign materials: It
"creates that all-important good
impression." The judicial shout-out, while
without legal meaning, is a useful courtesy.
If you're the world's senior constitutional
court, it doesn't hurt to reach out to those
more junior courts, and say, "we hear ya,"
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even if we proceed to ignore their reasoning.
This is especially true for the fledgling
constitutional courts whose development the
United States has tried to encourage for the
last several decades. The shout-out, in short,
is how the court increases its intellectual
influence.
Third, while good judges copy, great judges
steal: American courts have been borrowing
ideas from other legal systems since the
beginning. The 1877 landmark Supreme
Court opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff is a
sterling example. In a case taught in every
first-year procedure class, Justice Field
borrowed concepts from public international
law and made them part of the due-process
clause of the United States Constitution.
(More specifically, Pennoyer tapped
international concepts of territorial
sovereignty to rule states judicially
powerless outside of their borders.) As
Pennoyer shows, there's a difference
between relying on alien cases and simply
borrowing ideas from clever foreigners. The
latter implies no future obligation.
The final and perhaps most important reason
to discuss foreign precedent is to promote
judicial honesty. What Scalia and the House
Republicans advocate is a kind of judicial
mind-control: They want judges to banish
sinful, foreign thoughts when deciding
cases, in exchange for a pure focus on that
founding moment in Philadelphia. But this
contemplates a 1 evel o f public c ontrol o ver
the judicial psyche that is unrealistic and,
frankly, unhealthy. The big constitutional
cases that reach the Supreme Court are
difficult-usually without obvious answers
from text of the Constitution or its history.
Faced with these kinds of problems, judges,
as Richard Posner puts it, will never be
"potted plants." They will (and should)
exercise their own judgment. That judgment
will inevitably be influenced by American
precedent, but also, let's be honest, by the
novels they read, their political friends, and
their visions of the ideal society and the
good life. If a judge dreams of making the
United States more like modern Europe or
medieval England, her decisions will reflect
those aspirations. So, why not come clean,
confess to the charisma of foreign ideas, and
err on the side ofjudicial candor?
Unfortunately, if the congressional
resolutions are any sign, the flap over
foreign citation will get stupider before it
gets smarter. Which is a shame because
claims of "foreign taint" are as lame a libel
today as they were in the 1790s. We should
ask: Is someone as intellectually stubborn as
Sandra Day O'Connor realistically in danger
of corruption by foreign influence? Pas
question.
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Courting the World: U.S. Judges Must Overcome a Culture of Legal Isolationism-Or
Risk Being Left Behind
Foreign Policy
March-April, 2004
Anne-Marie Slaughter
U.S. judges must overcome a culture of
legal i solationism-or risk b eing 1 eft b ehind.
When the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled last summer that a Texas anti-
sodomy law was unconstitutional, it was a
surprise victory for civil rights advocates
and the gay and lesbian community. That
case, Lawrence v. Texas, was also one of the
rare instances in which the court cited the
decision of a foreign court in a majority
opinion. The Supreme Court overruled a
1986 decision in which then Chief justice
Warren Burger had argued that nations
sharing the United States' cultural heritage
had long condemned homosexuality. In
Lawrence, justice Anthony Kennedy pointed
to a 1981 decision by the European Court of
Human Rights that struck down an anti-
sodomy law in Northern Ireland to show that
many members of Western civilization had a
more tolerant view than Burger had
maintained.
That short citation was a victory for the
internationalists on the court-led by justices
Stephen Breyer, Sandra Day O'Connor, and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg-who have been
arguing for a decade that U.S. judges must
become less parochial. On the other side of
the debate are attitudes like those expressed
in 1999, when justice Clarence Thomas
concurred with justice John Paul Stevens in
denying a death penalty appeal. Speaking
for the nationalist (some would say
isolationist) wing of the court, Thomas
rebuked colleagues who cited foreign
precedents by noting, "were there any such
support [for the defendant's argument] in
our own jurisprudence, it would be
unnecessary for proponents of the claim to
rely on the European Court of Human
Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the
Supreme Court of India, or the Privy
Council."
At stake in this legal tussle is whether the
United States will participate in an
accelerating process of judicial
globalization, both at the level of ordinary
private commercial law and of fundamental
constitutional and human rights principles.
The European Commission for Democracy.
. . now operates a Web site called
CODICES, which regularly collects and
digests the decisions of constitutional courts
and courts of equivalent jurisdiction around
the world. And in Asia, Taiwan's
constitutional court has translated large
portions of its caselaw into English and
made them available on its Web site to
ensure it isp art oft he global dialogue. By
exchanging views, sharing expertise, and
citing each other's opinions, judges around
the world are cobbling together a global
legal structure-one the United States ignores
at its peril.
This ad hoc system is far from the
hierarchical world order many international
law enthusiasts have imagined. For starters,
it offers no world supreme court to resolve
disputes or pronounce authoritatively on
binding rules of international law. Instead,
what is developing is messier and more
complex. It is a system comprising networks
of national and international judges, usually
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the product of shared jurisdiction over an
area of the law-from bankruptcy to refugees-
or a particular area of the world, such as the
European Union (EU) or the Asia-Pacific
region.
In the realm of commercial law, a
globalizing economy has been crucial in
driving judicial collaboration. In
transnational bankruptcy disputes, for
instance, national courts are concluding
"cross-border insolvency cooperation
protocols," which are essentially mini-
treaties setting forth each side's role in
resolving disputes. [ .. ]
The judges who participate in these
networks are rarely motivated by a
missionary zeal to build a global system.
Rather, they are driven by more prosaic
concerns, such as judicial politics, the
demands of a heavy caseload, and the
impact of new international rules on national
litigants. In the EU legal system, for
instance, a lower-court judge in a national
court who is butting heads with colleagues
on a point of law often has the option of
referring a case to the Court of justice of the
European Communities to gain support. In
areas such as trade, intellectual property, the
environment, and human rights, national
courts around the world compare each
other's interpretations of international
treaties.
Some conservatives in the United States
charge that judges who look beyond their
country's borders violate their sworn duty to
defend and uphold the constitution. But this
nationalist position ignores the tremendous
opportunity cost that comes with denying
U.S. courts a voice in this global dialogue.
The U nited S tates h as a lways p reached t he
virtues of its legal system. After the second
World War, the United States helped
establish new constitutional courts in
Germany and Japan. In the 1990s, the U.S.
government helped shape the path-breaking
International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia. Today, the United States
pushes courts in fledgling democracies to
learn from its example. But why must such
learning flow only one way? Does the
United States have nothing to learn from any
other jurisdiction? Beyond hypocrisy, the
U.S. aversion to drawing on foreign
decisions invites charges of judicial
imperialism. Why should U.S. judges be
able to consult work by economists and
political scientists around the world (as they
often do) but not the decisions of judges in
other countries? Ginsburg, for instance,
argues that U.S. courts might be able to
learn from India's legal wrangling with its
caste system as U.S. judges confront the
thorny issue of affirmative action. "In the
area of human rights," she observes,
"experience in one nation or region may
inspire or inform other nations or regions."
Although global problems often require a
global governing capacity, most
governments and publics are unwilling to
accept an international centralization of
power. The emerging international legal
dialogue offers a solution to that dilemma. A
global legal system made of loose judicial
networks in which national judges retain
their autonomy but profit from one another's
wisdom, experience, and occasional
cooperation is far more attractive to most
U.S. citizens-and indeed to most Europeans,
Africans, Latin Americans, and Asians-than
an international legal hierarchy. It's no
world court, but it works.
Judges are rarely motivated by a missionary
zeal to build a global legal system. Rather,
they are driven by more prosaic concerns,
such as the demands of a heavy caseload.
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Judicial Interpretation of Laws Based on Foreign Precedents
Committee on House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitution
March 25, 2004
Statement of John 0. McGinnis
Professor of Law, Northwestern University
This hearing is not prompted simply by the
academic question of the relevance of
foreign and international law to
constitutional interpretation. In the recent
case of Lawrence v. Texas the Supreme
Court held that the due process clause
protected a substantive right to sodomy and
relied upon a case from the European Union
as persuasive authority for that result. After
citing the case, Justice Anthony Kennedy,
writing for the majority, pressed the
European analogy: The right the petitioners
seek in this case has been accepted as an
integral part of human freedom in many
other countries. There has been no showing
that in this country the governmental interest
in circumscribing personal choice is
somehow more legitimate or urgent.
Thus, the question I want to address is
whether the Court should use foreign or
international law as persuasive authority in
interpreting our own Constitution. I believe
that subject to certain caveats the Court
should not use foreign law or international
law and that its use in Lawrence is
exemplary of all that is wrong with such an
approach to constitutional interpretation. I
should note that this question is entirely
separate from the question of whether
Lawrence was rightly decided and certainly
separate from whether laws against sodomy
are wvise. I, for my part, think such laws are
unwise and should be repealed.
One straightforward argument that rules out
most use of foreign law in constitutional
interpretation is that in almost all cases it is
inconsistent with the correct way of
interpreting the constitution-interpreting the
Constitution according to its original
meaning.
If originalism is the right interpretative
theory of the Constitution, there will be little
occasion to use contemporary foreign
precedent as persuasive authority because
contemporary foreign precedent would not
generally cast light on what a reasonable
person at the time of ratifying the
Constitution would have understood to be its
meaning.
Within an originalist theory of interpretation
there a re t wo other possible p roper uses o f
foreign and international precedent. Resort
to contemporary foreign or international lawv
might be proper if the original Constitution
calls for reference to contemporary foreign
or international law. The Constitution may
do this in limited circumstances as when it
permits Congress to "define offenses against
the law of nations." Once again under the
constitutional provisions for treaty making
the political actors rather the courts are
choosing to bring international law into our
domestic regime.
Finally, foreign law could be relevant to
prove a fact about the world which is
relevant to the law. For instance, it might be
useful to evaluate an assertion that one
consequence follows from another, because
one could sho\w that in some legal systems
the consequence does not always follow.
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I would thus modify the resolution to make
clear that these uses of foreign or
international law are legitimate.
Even if one does not accept an originalist
theory of Constitutional interpretation,
substantial pragmatic problems militate
against relying on contemporary foreign and
international law as sources of constitutional
authority. First, the Constitution contains no
rule as to which of the many bits of
conflicting foreign rules of law should be
used as persuasive precedent. Judges
therefore are likely to use their own
discretion in choosing what foreign law to
apply and what foreign law to reject. Judges
will use foreign law as a cover for their
discretionary judgments.
Lawrence exemplifies this problem. While
the European Union protects sodomy as a
constitutional right, many nations still
criminalize s odomy. Why should the Court
look to the European Union and not these
other nations?
Unfortunately, the Lawrence Court never
answers this question. It instead simply felt
flee to pick and choose from decisions
around the world the ones that it likes, to use
them as justification or at least decoration
for its own ruling, and to ignore decisions
that are contrary. It is hard to think of a
more ad hoc and manipulable basis for
interpreting the United States Constitution.
Second, the problem with using foreign
decisions is that they are the consequence of
a whole set of norms and governmental
structures that are different from those in the
United States. They may be appropriate for
their nations but out of place in nations with
different government structures.
Thus, foreign constitutional norms do not
just reflect certain 'iews about the content
of substantive rights but also a foreign mode
of defining them. Any judicial opinion from
another culture is the culmination of a
complex institutional structure for producing
norms. The low cost of accessing the mere
words of a foreign judicial opinion can blind
us to the fact that we are only seeing the
surface of a far deeper social structure that is
incompatible with American institutions.
This does not necessarily mean that the
American political system as a whole is
better than that o f s ome o thers, b ut it does
caution against assuming that judicial
decisions from other nations will produce
the same good effects here that they may
produce in a significantly different political
system.
Third, promiscuous use o f foreign law will
undermine domestic support for the
Constitution. T he C onstitution b egins: " We
the People . . . do ordain a nd establish t he
Constitution of the United States." In a
fonnal sense, the entire Constitution is an
expression of the views of the people of the
United States, not some other people.
Relying on international or foreign law
except when the Constitution directs us to
look at the law flouts this first principle.
This formal point has social implications.
The Constitution has commanded respect
and allegiance because it our Constitution,
not a document imposed from abroad.
The emphatically American nature of our
Constitution has been a source of affection
and pride that have contributed to our social
stability. I want to close by discussing an
argument that some in ay deploy to s uggest
that q uite ab it o f foreign a nd international
law should be used in interpreting the
Constitution. It is the claim that some
clauses of the Constitution themselves
contemplate an evolving meaning and
foreign law can help chart the course of this
evolution. Thus, the Supreme Court itself
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appears to interpret the cruel and unusual
punishment clause in light of evolving
standards of human decency rather than the
standards at the time the clause was framed.
It is in this context that the Supreme Court
in Atkins v. Virginia cited to the worldwide
community's general refusal to execute the
cognitively impaired as evidence that
evolving standards demand that the United
States end such executions.
Let u s a ssume for a m oment that t he cruel
and unusual clause should be tied to
evolving standards in general It does not
follow that the Framers would have wanted
to tie these evolving standards to the
standards of other nations around the world
rather than focus only on domestic
evolution. At the time the Constitution was
framed the United States was one of the few
republican nations in the world and the
Framers often distinguished its practices
from the world's ancient regimes. It seems
very unlikely that given the self-conscious
exceptionalism of the United States that the
Framers would have wanted make the
standards of our Bill of Rights depend on the
practices of other nations.
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Committee on House Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitution
March 25, 2004
Statement of Vicki C. Jackson
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Thank you for the opportunity to provide a
statement on proposed House Resolution
568. I want to make three points. First, the
"law of nations" and the practices of other
constitutional systems have been used since
the Founding period to assist the Court in
reaching appropriate interpretations of
American law. Second, the Court's use of
foreign law in Lawrence v. Texas was not to
bind or control its judgments of
constitutional questions under U.S. law but
to assist the Court in making the best
interpretations of our own law. Third,
legislative directions to the courts on how to
interpret the Constitution raise serious
separation of powers questions and might be
perceived to threaten j udicial i ndependence
in ways inconsistent with important
traditions of American constitutionalism.
For these reasons I would urge the House
not to adopt the proposed resolution.
Far from being hostile to considering foreign
countries' views or laws, the Founding
generation of our Nation had what the
signers of the Declaration of Independence
described as a "decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind." Congress was
empowered in our Constitution to regulate
foreign commerce and to prescribe
"Offenses against the Law of Nations," the
President authorized to receive ambassadors,
and the federal courts given jurisdiction over
cases arising under treaties as w ell as under
the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and over suits affecting ambassadors,
or involving aliens or foreign countries as
parties in some cases. The Federalist Papers
explained that
An attention to the judgment of other
nations is important to every
government for two reasons: the one
is, that, independently of the merits
of any particular plan or measure, it
is desirable ... that it should appear to
other nations as the offspring of a
wise and honorable policy; the
second is, that in doubtful cases,
particularly where the national
councils may be warped by some
strong passion or momentary
interest, the presumed or known
opinion of the impartial world may
be the best guide that can be
followed.
The Federalist No. 63 (Hamilton or
Madison).
Although Federalist No. 63 was not directed
to the courts, Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton)
explained the need for a judicial power
broad enough to resolve disputes in which
foreign nations had an interest in order to
avoid causes for war. U.S. Supreme Court
Justices from the founding period
recognized the relevance of the "law of
nations" in interpreting U.S. law and
resolving disputes before the federal courts.
As Justice Story said, in writing the
foundational Supreme Court decision in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the judicial
power of the United States included
categories of jurisdiction, such as admiralty,
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"in the correct adjudication of which foreign
nations are deeply interested .... [and in]
which the principles of the law and comity
of nations often form an essential inquiry."
This brings me to my second point. The
Court's recent references to foreign law and
legal practice seems to me entirely
consistent with the founding generation's
respectful interest in other countries'
opinions and legal rules. Lawrence did not
treat foreign court decisions as binding
authority, which is an important distinction.
Rather, the foreign decisions were cited in
Lawrence for two purposes: The first was to
correct or clarify the historical record
referred to in Chief Justice Burger's opinion
in Bowers v. Hardwick a decision reversed
by Lawrence.
As the Lawrence Court wrote, "The
sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger
to the history of Western civilization and to
Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards
did not take account of other authorities
pointing in an opposite direction," including
the Dudgeon case decided by the European
Court of Human Rights in 1981. Second, the
Lawrence opinion suggested, the European
decisions invalidating laws prohibiting
adult, consensual homosexual conduct
raised the question whether there were
different governmental interests in the
United States that would support such a
prohibition on human freedom, and
concluded there were not. This use of
foreign I aw to i nterrogate a nd q uestion o ur
own understandings is something that will
help improve the process of judicial
reasoning, but certainly does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that our law should
follow that foreign law.
Indeed, on a number of occasions our Court
has referred to foreign practice to distinguish
our own Constitution from that of other
nations. In the great Youngstown Steel Case,
the Court held that President Truman lacked
constitutional power to order seizure of the
steel companies. Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson alluded to the dangers of
dictatorship that other countries had recently
experienced, Justice Jackson explaining in
some detail features of the Weimar
Constitution in Germany. After describing
the protections of, inter alia, England,
Scotland and India, against improper
custodial confessions, the Court indicated
that our own situation was similar enough
that their positive experience gave"
assurance that lawlessness will not result
from warning an individual of his rights or
allowing him to exercise them." It went on
to say:
It is consistent with our legal system
that we give at least as much
protection to these rights as is given
in the jurisdictions described. We
deal in our country with rights
grounded in a specific requirement
of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, whereas other
jurisdictions arrived at their
conclusions on the basis of principles
of justice not so specifically defined.
Considering other courts' decisions on
shared concepts of liberty, equality,
freedom of expression, cruel and unusual
punishment can help clarify what the U.S.
Constitution stands for to what extent its
precepts are shared, and to what extent they
are distinctive. The U.S. constitution has,
directly or indirectly, inspired many other
nations to include commitments to liberty,
freedom and equality in their own
constitutions. It is thus understandable that
such nations may look to our courts'
238
decisions and over time expect our courts to
be aware of their courts' interpretations of
legal concepts having a common source of
inspiration. For the many nations around the
world whose own constitutions have been
inspired in part by that of the United States,
and whose judges believe that we share
commitments to ideas of liberty, freedom
and equality, the U.S. Court's occasional
consideration of foreign court decisions is,
in a sense, a recognition of common judicial
commitments often inspired by the
example of the United States to the
protection of individual rights. And on the
current Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, as
well as Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy,
Scalia and Stevens, have referred to or
noted foreign or international legal sources
in their opinions in U.S. constitutional cases.
It is thus not only a traditional legal practice
but one that has been used by justices who
otherwise have very different views. Finally,
the questions of what sources are to be
considered in giving meaning to the
Constitution in adjudication is one that is, in
my view, committed by the Constitution to
the judicial department. Marbury v. Madison
famously explained:" It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is." [. . .
Around the world, the most widely emulated
institution established by the U.S.
Constitution has been the provision for
independent courts to engage in judicial
review of the constitutionality of the acts of
other branches and levels of government.
Congress should be loath even to attempt to
intrude on this judicial function, with respect
to a practice that dates back to the founding,
and at a time when the United States is
deeply engaged in promoting democratic
constitutionalism in countries around the
world, including provision for independent
courts to provide enforcement of
constitutional guarantees.
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Remarks for the American Constitutional Society
Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in
Constitutional Adjudication
August 2, 2003
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice
The Supreme Court of the United States
The United States was once virtually alone
in exposing laws and official acts to judicial
review for constitutionality. But particularly
in the years following World War II, many
nations installed constitutional review by
courts as one safeguard against oppressive
government and stirred up majorities.
National, multinational and international
human rights charters and tribunals today
play a key part in a world with increasingly
porous borders. My message tonight is
simply this: We are the losers if we do not
both share our experience with, and learn
from others.
That message is hardly original. A
prominent jurist put it this way 14 years ago:
For nearly a century and a half,
courts in the United States
exercising the power of judicial
review [for constitutionality] had no
precedents to look to save their own,
because our courts alone exercised
this sort of authority. When many
new constitutional courts were
created after the Second World War,
these courts naturally looked to
decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States, among other
sources, for developing their own
law. But now that constitutional law
is solidly grounded in so many
countries, it is time that the United
States courts begin looking to the
decisions of other constitutional
courts to aid in their own deliberative
process.
The speaker was Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist. More recently, Justice O'Connor
said: "While ultimately we must bear
responsibility for interpreting our own laws,
there is much to learn from .. . distinguished
jurists [in other places] who have given
thought to the same difficult issues that we
face here."
In the value I place on comparative
dialogue-on sharing with and learning
form others-I count myself an originalist in
this sense. The 1776 Declaration of
Independence, you will recall, expressed
concern about the opinions of other peoples;
it placed before the World the reasons why
the Untied States of America (the new
nation was called that in the Declaration)
was impelled to separate from Great Britain.
The Declaration did so out of "a decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind." It
submitted the "Facts"-the "long train of
[the British Crown's] Abuses and
Usurpations"-to the scrutiny of "a candid
World."
In writing the Constitution, the Framers
looked to other systems and to thinkers from
other lands for enlightenment, and they
understood that the new nation would be
bound by "the Law of Nations," today called
international law. Among powers granted
Congress, the Framers enumerated the
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power "[t]o define and punish [. .]
Offences against the Law of Nations."
But, our "island" or "lone ranger" mentality
is beginning to change. Our Justices, as I
noted at the start of these remarks, are
becoming more open to comparative and
international law perspectives. The term
just ended may prove a milestone in that
regard. New York Times reporter Linda
Greenhouse observed in her annual roundup
of the Court's decisions: The Court has
"displayed a [steadily growing] attentiveness
to legal developments in the rest of the
world and to the [C]ourt's role in keeping
the United States in step with them."
In the Michigan affirmative action cases, in
separate opinions, joined in one case by
Justice Breyer, in the other in full by Justice
Souter and in part by Justice Breyer, I
looked to two United Nations Conventions:
the 1965 International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, which the United States has
ratified; and the 1979 Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which, sadly, the United
States has not yet ratified. Both Conventions
distinguish between impermissible policies
of oppression or exclusion, and permissible
policies of inclusion, "temporary special
measures aimed at accelerating de facto
equality." The Court's decision in the Law
School case, I observed, "accords with the
international understanding of the office of
affirmative action."
A better indicator, because it attracted a
majority, is Justice Kennedy's opinion for
the Court in Lawrence v. Texas, announce
June 26. [T]he Court emphasized: "The
right the petitioners seek in this case has
been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries." In
support, the Court cited the leading, 1981
European Court of Human Rights decision,
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, and follow on
European Human Rights Court decisions
affirming the protected right of homosexual
adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct.
Recognizing that forecast are risky, I
nonetheless believe we will continue to
accord "a decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind" as a matter of comity and in a
spirit of humility. Comity, because projects
vital to our well being-combating
international terrorism is a prime example-
require trust and cooperation of nations the
world over. And humility because, in
Justice O'Connor's words: "Other legal
systems continue to innovate, to experiment,
and to find new solutions to the new legal
problems that arise each day, from which we
can learn and benefit."
In conclusion, my cheers as you undertake
the challenging mission to support and
nurture the Constitution, as it has evolved
over the span of two centuries and more.
The time is right for that mission. As
Abigail Adams wrote to her son of the era in
which he was coming of age:
These are the times in which a
genius would wish to live. It is not
in the still calm of life, or the repose
of a pacific station, that great
characters are formed. The habits of
a vigorous mind are formed in
contending with difficulties.
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We Promised the World; Now President Bush Should Honor
Our Treaty Obligations to Foreigners in U.S. Courts
Legal Times
April 12, 2004
Stuart Taylor
Much of what goes by the name
"international law" in academic and
European circles these days deserves little
respect from the United States, because it
consists of rules made by foreign judges and
professors that this sovereign nation has
never adopted. Many internationalists claim,
for example, that firing missiles at terrorist
leaders such as Osama bin Laden, as the
Clinton administration once did, and
aggressively interrogating captured
terrorists, as the Bush administration is
doing, violate international law.
Critics in Europe a nd elsewhere also assail
the United States for refusing to submit to
the jurisdiction of the new International
Criminal Court, ostensibly created to bring
genocidal monsters and notorious war
criminals to justice. But the Bush
administration's wanness seems vindicated
by the ICC chief prosecutor's publicly
expressing an itch to go after multinational
executives who do business with regimes
that, in his judgment, have used the proceeds
to facilitate atrocities. Meanwhile, some ICC
enthusiasts dream of prosecuting U.S.
commanders for civilian casualties in war
zones.
The conservative backlash against such stuff
is understandable. But the backlash has gone
too far, with many conservatives scoffing at
the idea that the United States should ever
heed international law or honor inconvenient
rulings by international tribunals. At a time
when much of the world sees America as an
international scofflaw, and when we need
the world's help to protect
terrorism, this attitude is
ourselves from
self-defeating.
It's past time for the Bush administration to
show respect for the legitimate demands of
international law. One big test will be its so-
far-noncommittal response to a debatable
but quite defensible March 31 decision by
the 58-year-old World Court - formally
known as the International Court of Justice,
and not to be confused with the ICC - in a
lawsuit by Mexico against the United States
on behalf of more than 50 Mexicans on
death row in various state prisons.
This Was the Deal
The Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1963 requires that foreign
nationals be notified, at the time of their
arrests, that they are entitled to call and meet
with their home country's consular officials.
Consulates can be helpful in finding
lawyers, notifying relatives, gathering
exculpatory evidence from home, and
otherwise. But state and local officials are
often unaware of this treaty obligation and
fail to give the required notice. Mexico
urged the World Court to rule that this lack
of notice in itself denies a fair trial, and that
the defendants' convictions must therefore
be overturned.
The court rejected this argument. Instead, it
ordered the United States to provide for
judicial "review and reconsideration of the
convictions and sentences" on a case-by-
case basis, to determine whether the
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violations "caused actual prejudice" to the
fair-trial rights of any of these Mexicans [or
other foreign nationals]. In most or all cases,
such hearings would probably end in rulings
that the trials were fair and the executions
could proceed. And even if some death
sentences were overturned, none of the
Mexicans would go free as long as their
guilt is clear.
This is not to deny that the World Court's
decision presents vexing constitutional and
political issues. President George W. Bush
may lack constitutional power simply to
order governors or state courts to delay
executions and hold new hearings. A 1996
act of Congress bars lower federal courts
from holding new habeas corpus hearings in
these cases. The Supreme Court has been
unreceptive to such appeals. Rick Perry,
Bush's successor as governor of Texas, has
already, in effect, told the World Court to go
jump in a lake. And that's what Bush's
conservative base would want him to tell the
court.
But this is a case in which keeping the
nation's promises is more important than
pleasing the Republican base or expediting
executions. Bush and his aides can and
should forcefully urge state officials to
waive any objections to the new hearings. If
that fails, the Justice Department can and
should tell state courts and, ultimately, the
U.S. Supreme Court that this country has
explicitly consented to comply both with the
consular convention and with the World
Court's interpretation of it; that such treaties
are " the supreme law of the land," binding
on "judges in every state" under Article VI
of the Constitution; that the World Court's
decision is legitimate; and that international
law - or, at a minimum, comity - calls for
deference to it.
If, on the other hand, the Bush
administration dismisses or disregards the
decision, the denunciations of U.S.
lawlessness will reach a new crescendo,
especially in Mexico, where the case is a
cause celebre. And the denouncers will have
a point.
We Agreed to It
Unlike the ICC, which claims the
unprecedented, politically unaccountable
power to prosecute and imprison anyone in
the world accused of committing or assisting
certain grave crimes, the World Court hears
only suits between nations that have
consented to its jurisdiction. The United
States has done so since 1946. The Reagan
administration partially withdrew that
consent in 1985, because the court was
entertaining what the United States deemed
an illegitimate suit over the U.S. mining of
Nicaraguan harbors and arming of Contra
rebels. But the United States has never
withdrawn its explicit consent to comply
with the World Court's interpretation of the
consular convention.
And for good reason. The consular
convention is the same treaty on which U.S.
nationals who find themselves in foreign
jails depend for access to U.S. consular
officials- perhaps the only hope o fs eeing
daylight anytime soon in some precincts.
This is also one of the treaties that the
United States invoked in winning the May
1980 World Court decision ordering Iran to
release its American hostages. [Iran ignored
the ruling, which - like all its other rulings -
the court had no practical power to enforce.]
This is the third case in which the World
Court has faulted the United States for
violating the consular rights of foreign
nationals who ended up on death row. In all
such cases, U.S. courts, including the
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Supreme Court in 1998, have held that t he
defendants could not raise consular
violations in appealing their murder
convictions and death sentences, because
their original lawyers had neglected to raise
the issue at trial - a doctrine known as
"procedural default."
In the 1998 decision and another in 1999,
the Supreme Court summarily rejected last-
minute appeals to delay the executions of
two inmates despite World Court rulings
that they should be kept alive until that court
had time to resolve suits by the inmates'
home countries - Paraguay and Germany,
respectively. The World Court proceeded
with Germany's suit and held in 2001 that
use of the procedural default doctrine to bar
appeals in such cases itself violates the
consular convention, by denying an
adequate remedy for the original lack of
notification.
Consider the Mexicans
Then came Mexico's suit, which produced
the more definitive Avena decision on
March 31, with the lone U.S. judge joining
the 14-1 majority. The World Court
reaffirmed its 2001 decision and rejected the
State Department's argument that the right
to seek gubernatorial clemency is an
adequate remedy for consular violations. But
the court did not give Mexico everything it
wanted. Not only did it refuse to find the
convictions and sentences invalid; it also
rejected Mexico's argument that any
confessions or other evidence obtained from
prisoners before notification of consular
rights must be excluded from future trials.
Critics nonetheless assail the World Court
decision as an overly aggressive, even
outrageous effort by America-bashing death
penalty opponents to interject foreign judges
into routine state court proceedings. In my
view, however, it is not unreasonable to ask
that - before putting foreign nationals to
death over their own governments'
objections - the United States and its courts
provide an opportunity to prove that they
wouldn't have been convicted or condemned
but for U.S. violations of their consular
rights.
Even though the guilt of most or all of these
prisoners is not in doubt, such hearings
would be worth the time and effort. In some
cases, Mexico and other governments might
be able to show that, if given timely notice,
their consular officials could have found
enough mitigating evidence to persuade trial
juries not to vote for death. More important,
the U.S. government might be able to show
that it takes its treaty obligations seriously.
The Supreme Court is going global - and
not just in the sense that several of the
justices have embarked on their annual
summer voyages to European destinations.
Rather, the court's own decision-making is
beginning to reflect the influence of
international legal norms, as well as rulings
by courts in foreign countries.
The trend peaked in the two most important
cases of the recently completed term - the
court's rulings permitting race-conscious
admissions in higher education and
abolishing state prohibitions on private,
consensual homosexual conduct.
In both cases, justices invoked legal
principles that were not made exclusively in
the United States.
In the affirmative action case, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor wrote for a 5-to-4 majority
that the University of Michigan Law
School's effort to enroll a "critical mass" of
black, Latino and Native American
applicants could pass muster under the U.S.
Constitution - though such programs might
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not be necessary 25 years from now. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate
concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Stephen G. Breyer, that noted that the
court's 25-year time frame was consistent
with the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, ratified by the United States
in 1994, but that it should not be considered
a firm forecast.
More decisively, Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy buttressed his majority opinion in
the homosexual conduct case by noting that
the court's past approval of state sodomy
bans w as out of step with the law i n other
Western democracies. Citing opinions of
the European Court of Human Rights, he
wrote that "the right the petitioners seek in
this case has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other
countries."
The court's consideration of these
international perspectives was a
breakthrough for the "transnational" legal
perspective, which, advocates say,
recognizes the United States - historically
an innovator in constitutional adjudication -
now has much to learn from the rapidly
developing constitutional traditions of other
democracies.
"Human rights progress is not the same in
every part of the world at the same time,"
said Harold Hongju Koh, a professor of
international law at Yale who served as
assistant secretary of state for democracy,
human rights and labor in the Clinton
administration. "In the U.S., we're ahead on
some issues, but behind on others, such as
the death penalty, gay rights and
immigrants' rights."
Koh noted that the court's 2002 ruling
banning the death penalty for mentally
retarded criminals also invoked international
opinion. In explaining why that practice
violated contemporary notions of
permissible punishment, Justice John Paul
Stevens writing for a 6 to 3 majority, said
that "within the world community, the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved." Stevens
attributed this observation to a friend-of-the-
court brief filed by the European Union.
This approach is not without its critics,
however, and some of the sharpest
criticism has come from within the court
itself, especially from Justice Antonin
Scalia.
Responding to Stevens in the death penalty
case, Scalia sardonically awarded Stevens's
reference to the "world community" a "Prize
for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to
fabricate 'national consensus.' "
Citing his own words from one of the
court's previous death penalty cases, Scalia
wrote: "We must never forget that it is a
Constitution for the United States of
America that we are expounding. [. .]
[W]here there is not first a settled consensus
among our own people, the views of other
nations, however enlightened the Justices of
this Court may think them to be, cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the
Constitution."
Scalia's view is supported by conservative
legal scholars who regard the court's use of
international legal sources as an
intellectually amorphous endeavor that
would subject U.S. citizens to the decisions
of foreign legal institutions. "When the court
starts taking things like that into account, it
reveals itself as more interested in making
policy than interpreting the fixed texts of the
Constitution or statutes," said John C. Yoo,
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a former Bush administration adviser on
international law, who teaches law at the
University of California at Berkeley.
Koh and Yoo agree on one thing: Both said
that the justices' interest in international
law has probably been influenced by
meetings with fellow jurists on their
frequent visits abroad.
"Today, the justices are traveling much
more than they once did," Koh said. "And
when they go overseas, the question they are
asked is, 'How does your jurisprudence fit in
with that of other countries?'
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain
(124 S.Ct. 2739)
Ruling Below: 331 F.3d 604; 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10949
Mexican citizens, acting on behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), kidnapped
the Mexican national from Mexico and transported him to the U.S., where he was held, tried, and
acquitted for his alleged involvement in the murder of a DEA agent. The Mexican national
subsequently filed suit. The district court found that the former Mexican policeman was liable
under the ATCA, but dismissed FTCA claims. On appeal, the court held that the DEA had no
authority to effect the Mexican national's arrest and detention in Mexico, and the Mexican
national could seek relief in federal court. The district court erred by dismissing the FTCA
claims; the foreign activities exception did not apply because the Mexican national's kidnapping
fit the headquarters doctrine. Nor did the intentional tort exception apply.
Questions Presented: Whether respondent Alvarez-Machain's allegation that the Drug
Enforcement Administration instigated his abduction from Mexico for criminal trial in the
United States supports a claim against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA or Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), §§ 2671-2680, and whether he may recover under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Jose FRANCISCO SOSA, Petitioner,
V.
Humberto ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, et. al., Respondent.
UNITED STATES, Petitioner,
V.
Humberto ALVAREZ-MACHAIN, et. al.
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 29, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
SOUTER, J.: Administration (DEA), Enrique Camarena-
Salazar, was captured on assignment in
[. . .] We hold that [Alvarez-Machain] is not Mexico and taken to a house in Guadalajara,
entitled to a remedy under either statute. where he was tortured over the course of a
2-day interrogation, then murdered. Based in
Facts part on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials
in the United States came to believe that
In 1985, an agent of the Drug Enforcement respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain
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(Alvarez), a Mexican physician, was present
at the house and acted to prolong the agent's
life in order to extend the interrogation and
torture.
In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted
Alvarez for the torture and murder of
Camarena-Salazar, and the United States
District Court for the Central District of
California issued a warrant for his arrest.
The DEA asked the Mexican Government
for help in getting Alvarez into the United
States, but when the requests and
negotiations proved fruitless, the DEA
approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to
seize Alvarez and bring him to the United
States for trial. As so planned, a group of
Mexicans, including petitioner Jose
Francisco Sosa, abducted Alvarez from his
house, held him overnight in a motel, and
brought him by private plane to El Paso,
Texas, where he was arrested by federal
officers. [ .. .]
The case was tried in 1992, and ended at the
close of the Government's case, when the
District Court granted Alvarez's motion for
a judgment of acquittal.
In 1993, after returning to Mexico, Alvarez
began the civil action before us here. So far
as it matters here, Alvarez sought damages
from the United States under the FTCA,
alleging false arrest, and from Sosa under
the ATS, for a violation of the law of
nations. The former statute authorizes suit
"for [... .] personal injury [. . .] caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or
employment." The latter provides in its
entirety that "the district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."
We granted certiorari in these companion
cases to clarify the scope of both the FTCA
and the ATS. We now reverse in each.
The Government seeks reversal of the
judgment of liability under the FTCA on
two principal grounds. It argues that the
arrest could not have been tortious, because
it was authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 878, setting
out the arrest authority of the DEA, and it
says that in any event the liability
asserted here falls within the FTCA
exception to waiver of so vereign immunity
for claims "arising in a foreign country[.]"
We think the exception applies and decide
on that ground.
The FTCA "was designed primarily to
remove the sovereign immunity of the
United States from suits in tort and, with
certain specific exceptions, to render the
Government liable in tort as a private
individual would be under like
circumstances." The Act accordingly gives
federal district courts jurisdiction over
claims against the United States for injury
"caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with t he 1 aw o ft he
place where the act or omission occurred."
But the Act also limits its waiver of
sovereign immunity in a number of ways. [.
Here the significant limitation on the waiver
of immunity is the Act's exception for "any
claim arising in a foreign country," a
provision that on its face seems plainly
applicable to the facts of this case. in the
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Ninth Circuit's view, once Alvarez was
within the borders of the United States, his
detention was not tortious, the appellate
court suggested that the Government's
liability to Alvarez rested solely upon a false
arrest claim. Alvarez's arrest, however, was
said to be "false," and thus tortious, only
because, and only to the extent that, it took
place and endured in Mexico. The actions in
Mexico are thus most naturally understood
as the kernel of a "claim arising in a foreign
country," and barred from suit under the
exception to the waiver of immunity. ...
(Discussing the headquarters doctrine as
subjecting the United States to suit despite
to FTCA's foreign country exception.)
When the FTCA was passed, the general
rule, as set out in various state statutes, was
that "a cause of action arising in another
jurisdiction, which is barred by the laws of
that jurisdiction, will [also] be barred in the
domestic courts."
[.. .] Any tort action in a court of the United
States based on the acts of a Government
employee causing harm outside the State of
the district court in which the action is filed
requires a determination of the source of the
substantive law that will govern liability.
When the FTCA was passed, the dominant
principle in choice of law analysis for tort
cases was lex loci delicti: courts generally
applied the law of the place where the injury
occurred. [ ... ]
The application of foreign substantive law
exemplified in these cases was, however,
what Congress intended to avoid by the
foreign country exception. [. . .]
Alvarez has also brought an action under the
ATS against petitioner, Sosa, who argues (as
does the United States supporting him) that
there is no relief under the ATS because the
statute does no more than vest federal courts
with jurisdiction, neither creating nor
authorizing the courts to recognize any
particular right of action without further
congressional action. Although we agree the
statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we
think that at the time of enactment the
jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear
claims in a very limited category defined by
the law of nations and recognized at
common law. [.. .]
But holding t he A TS j urisdictional raises a
new question, this one about the interaction
between the ATS at the time of its
enactment and the ambient law of the era.
Sosa would have it that the ATS was
stillborn because there could be no claim for
relief without a further statute expressly
authorizing adoption of causes of action.
Amici professors of federal jurisdiction and
legal history take a different tack, that
federal courts could entertain claims once
the jurisdictional grant was on the books,
because torts in violation of the law of
nations would have been recognized within
the common law of the time. [. . .]
[. . .] In the years of the early Republic, this
law of nations comprised two principal
elements, the first covering the general
norms governing the behavior of national
states with each other [. . .]
The law of nations included a second, more
pedestrian element, however, that did fall
within the judicial sphere, as a body of
judge-made law regulating the conduct of
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individuals situated outside domestic
boundaries and consequently carrying an
international savor. [. . .] The law merchant
emerged from the customary practices of
international traders and admiralty required
its own transnational regulation. [. . ]
There was, finally, a sphere in which these
rules binding individuals for the benefit of
other individuals overlapped with the norms
of state relationships. Blackstone referred to
it when he mentioned three specific offenses
against the law of nations addressed by the
criminal law of England: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy. It was this narrow
set of violations of the law of nations,
admitting of a judicial remedy and at the
same time threatening serious consequences
in international affairs, that was probably on
minds of the men who drafted the ATS with
its reference to tort.
[. . .] There is too much in the historical
record to believe that Congress would have
enacted the ATS only to leave it lying fallow
indefinitely.
[ . . ] Congress intended the ATS to furnish
jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of
actions alleging violations of the law of
nations. Uppermost in the legislative mind
appears to have been offenses against
ambassadors, violations of safe conduct
were p robably understood t o b e a ctionable,
and individual actions arising out of prize
captures and piracy may well have also been
contemplated. But the common law appears
to have understood only those three of the
hybrid variety as definite and actionable, or
at any rate, to have assumed only a very
limited set of claims. [. .]
In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional
statute creating no new causes of action, the
reasonable inference from the historical
materials is that the statute was intended to
have practical effect the moment it became
law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as
having been enacted on the understanding
that the common law would provide a cause
of action for the modest number of
international law violations with a potential
for personal liability at the time.
[. .] [T]here are good reasons for a
restrained conception of the discretion a
federal court should exercise in considering
a new cause of action of this kind.
Accordingly, we think courts should require
any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world
and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms
we have recognized. This requirement is
fatal to Alvarez's claim.
[. . .] [T]he general practice has been to look
for legislative guidance before exercising
innovative authority over substantive law. It
would be remarkable to take a more
aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction
that remained largely in shadow for much of
the prior two centuries.
[. . .] [T]his Court has recently and
repeatedly said that a decision to create a
private right of action is one better left to
legislative judgment in the great majority of
cases. 
...
[. . .] We have no congressional mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations [. .
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While we agree with JUSTICE SCALIA to
the point that we would welcome any
congressional guidance in exercising
jurisdiction with such obvious potential to
affect foreign relations, nothing Congress
has done is a reason for us to shut the door
to the law of nations entirely. It is enough to
say that Congress may do that at any time
(explicitly, or implicitly by treaties or
statutes that occupy the field) just as it may
modify or cancel any judicial decision so far
as it rests on recognizing an international
norm as such.
Thus, Alvarez's detention claim must be
gauged against the current state of
international law, looking to those sources
we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized.
To begin with, Alvarez cites two well-
known international agreements that, despite
their moral authority, have little utility under
the standard set out in this opinion. He says
that his abduction by Sosa was an "arbitrary
arrest" within the meaning of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration),
And he traces the rule against arbitrary
arrest not only to the Declaration, but also to
article nine of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (Covenant), to
which the United States is a party, and to
various other conventions to which it is not.
But the Declaration does not of its own force
impose obligations as a matter of
international law. [. .] And, although the
Covenant does bind the United States as a
matter of international law, the United States
ratified the Covenant on the express
understanding that it was not self-executing
and so did not itself create obligations
enforceable in the federal courts.
Accordingly, Alvarez cannot say that the
Declaration and Covenant themselves
establish the relevant and applicable rule of
international law. [.
Alvarez thus invokes a general prohibition
of "arbitrary" detention defined as officially
sanctioned action exceeding positive
authorization to detain under the domestic
law of some government, regardless of the
circumstances. [. . .] Alvarez cites little
authority that a rule so broad has the status
of a binding customary norm today. [. .]
His rule would support a cause of action in
federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the
world, unauthorized by the law of the
jurisdiction in which it took place, and
would create a cause of action for any
seizure of an alien in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, supplanting the actions under
Rev. Stat. § 1979, and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, that now
provide damages remedies for such
violations. It would create an action in
federal court for arrests by state officers who
simply exceed their authority; and for the
violation of any limit that the law of any
country might place on the authority of its
own officers to arrest. And all of this
assumes that Alvarez could establish that
Sosa was acting on behalf of a government
when he made the arrest, for otherwise he
would need a rule broader still.
Alvarez's failure to marshal support for his
proposed rule is underscored by the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (1987), which says
in its discussion of customary international
human rights law that a "state violates
international law if, as a matter of state
policy, it practices, encourages, or condones
[. . .I prolonged arbitrary detention." [ . ..
Any credible invocation of a principle
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against arbitrary detention that the civilized
world accepts as binding customary
international law requires a factual basis
beyond relatively brief detention in excess
of positive authority. [. .. ]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS
join, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.
There is not much that I would add to the
Court's detailed opinion, and only one thing
that I would subtract: its reservation of a
discretionary power in the Federal Judiciary
to create causes of action for the
enforcement of international-law-based
norms. ... .]
(Discussing the general lack of authority to
create causes of action through federal
common law.)
With these general principles in mind, I turn
to the question presented. The Court's
detailed exegesis of the ATS conclusively
establishes that it is "a jurisdictional statute
creating no new causes of action." The
Court provides a persuasive explanation of
why respondent's contrary interpretation,
that "the ATS was intended not simply as a
jurisdictional grant, but as authority for the
creation of a new cause of action for torts in
violation of international law," is wrong. [.
.]
[. . .] None of the exceptions to the general
rule against finding substantive lawmaking
power in a jurisdictional grant apply. [.
The analysis in the Court's opinion departs
from my own in this respect: After
concluding in Part III that "the ATS is a
jurisdictional statute creating no new causes
of action," the Court addresses at length the
"good reasons for a restrained conception of
the discretion a federal court should exercise
in considering a new cause of action" under
the ATS. By framing the issue as one of
"discretion," the Court skips over the
antecedent question of authority. This
neglects the "lesson of Erie," that "grants of
jurisdiction alone" (which the Court has
acknowledged the ATS to be) "are not
themselves grants of law-making authority."
[. . .] [C]ourts cannot possibly be thought to
have been given, and should not be thought
to possess, federal-common-law-making
powers with regard to the creation of private
federal causes of action for violations of
customary international law.
To be sure, today's opinion does not itself
precipitate a direct confrontation with
Congress by creating a cause of action that
Congress has not. But it invites precisely
that action by the lower courts [. . .] In
holding open the possibility that judges may
create rights where Congress has not
authorized them to do so, the Court
countenances judicial occupation of a
domain that belongs to the people's
representatives. [ ... ]
[. . .] This Court seems
admitting that some matters -
are none of its business [. . ]
incapable of
any matters -
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom
JUSTICE BREYER joins, concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment.
I join in full the Court's disposition of
Alvarez's claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
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1350. As toA lvarez's Federal T ort Claims
Act (FTCA or Act) claim, although I agree
with the Court's result and much of its
reasoning, I take a different path and would
adopt a different construction of 28 U.S.C. §
2680(k). [...]
[. .] Congress included in the FTCA a
series of exceptions to that sovereign-
immunity waiver. Relevant to this case, the
Act expressly excepts "any claim arising in
a foreign country." § 2680(k). I agree with
the Court that this provision, the foreign-
country exception, applies here, and bars
Alvarez's tort claim against the United
States. But I would read the words "arising
in," as they appear in § 2680(k), to signal
"place where the act or omission occurred,"
§ 1346(b)(1), not "place of injury."
On its face, the foreign-country exception
appears to cover this case. Alvarez's suit is
predicated on an arrest in Mexico alleged to
be "false" only because it occurred there. [.
.]1
Accepting, as the Ninth Circuit did, that no
tortious act occurred once Alvarez was
within United States borders, the
Government's liability on Alvarez's claim
for false arrest necessarily depended on the
foreign location of the arrest and implicated
foreign law.[. .]
The interpretation of the FTCA adopted by
the Ninth Circuit, in short, yielded liability
based on acts occurring in Mexico that
entangled questions of foreign law.
Subjecting the United States to liability
depending upon the law of a foreign
sovereign, however, was the very result §
2680(k)'s foreign-country exception aimed
to exclude.
[. . .] By directing attention to the place
where the last significant act or omission
occurred, rather than to a United States
location where some authorization, support,
or planning may have taken place, the ["last
significant act or omission"] rule preserves §
2680(k) as the genuine limitation Congress
intended it to be.
The "last significant act or omission" rule
works in this case to identify Mexico, not
California, as the place where the instant
case arose. I would apply that rule here to
hold that Alvarez's tort claim for false arrest
under the FTCA is barred under the foreign-
country exception. [. . .]
JUSTICE BREYER, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment.
I join JUSTICE GINSBURG's concurrence
and join the Court's opinion in respect to the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claim. [. . ]
I would add one further consideration. Since
enforcement of an international norm by one
nation's courts implies that other nations'
courts may do the same, I would ask
whether the exercise of jurisdiction under
the ATS is consistent with those notions of
comity that lead each nation to respect the
sovereign rights of other nations by limiting
the reach of its laws and their enforcement.
Today international law will sometimes
similarly reflect not only substantive
agreement as to certain universally
condemned behavior but also procedural
agreement that universal jurisdiction exists
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to prosecute a subset of that behavior. [ . ]
That subset includes torture, genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. [..
The fact that this procedural consensus
exists suggests that recognition of universal
jurisdiction in respect to a limited set of
norms is consistent with principles of
international comity. That is, allowing every
nation's courts to adjudicate foreign conduct
involving foreign parties in such cases will
not significantly threaten the practical
harmony that comity principles seek to
protect. That consensus concerns criminal
jurisdiction, but consensus as to universal
criminal jurisdiction itself suggests that
universal tort jurisdiction would be no more
threatening. Cf. Restatement § 404,
Comment b. That is because the criminal
courts of many nations combine civil and
criminal proceedings, allowing those injured
by criminal conduct to be represented, and
to recover damages, in the criminal
proceeding itself. [. . .]
Taking these matters into account, as I
believe courts should, I can find no similar
procedural consensus supporting the
exercise of jurisdiction in this case. [T]he
ATS does not recognize the claim at issue
here - where the underlying substantive
claim concerns arbitrary arrest, outside the
United States, of a citizen of one foreign
country by another.
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Human Rights Abuses Worldwide Are Held to Fall under U.S. Courts
The New York Times
June 30, 2004
Linda Greenhouse
A Supreme Court decision on Tuesday kept
federal courts open to lawsuits by foreigners
who allege that they were victims of serious
human rights violations anywhere in the
world.
The decision interpreting the Alien Tort
Statute came as a relief to human rights
organizations that had feared the court
would accept the Bush administration's
invitation to narrow the application of the
215-year-old law.
At the same time, the result was a sharp
disappointment to international business
interests, which have been alarmed by
increasing use of the law to sue
multinational corporations for human rights
violations and had looked to the Supreme
Court to curb the trend.
The case before the court did not involve a
corporate defendant, and the 6-to-3 decision
did not conclusively resolve the status of
such cases. That opportunity may come
soon, because lower courts with corporate
cases on their dockets have been deferring
decisions while waiting to see how the
Supreme Court would rule in this case.
A case brought on behalf of residents of
Myanmar charging the Unocal Corporation
with human rights violations in connection
with a gas pipeline project has already been
argued before the federal appeals court in
San Francisco and could reach the Supreme
Court quickly.
The case before the justices was an appeal of
an earlier ruling by the same appeals court,
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. That court permitted a
Mexican doctor, Humberto Alvarez-
Machain, to use the Alien Tort Statute to sue
a Mexican who helped the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration to kidnap him
from his office in Guadalajara and bring him
to the United States to stand trial for murder.
A grand jury had indicted Dr. Alvarez-
Machain in the murder of a federal narcotics
agent, Enrique Camarena-Salazar. He was
acquitted at his 1992 trial.
The Alien Tort Statute, which was among
the laws enacted by the First Congress in
1789, provides jurisdiction in federal district
courts "of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States."
The meaning of this statutory language,
including the odd phrase "for a tort only,"
is obscure and the law was scarcely used
until lower federal courts began applying it
in international human rights cases in the
1980's.
In Dr. Alvarez-Machain's case, the Ninth
Circuit found that the cross-border
kidnapping violated international law and
was thus the type of injury for which a
foreigner could sue in federal court. A jury
awarded the doctor a $25,000 judgment
against the Mexican defendant, Jose
Francisco Sosa, who then appealed to the
Supreme Court.
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In the decision on Tuesday, the last day of
the Supreme C ourt's t erm, all n ine j ustices
voted to overturn the Ninth Circuit's
judgment. "A single illegal detention of less
than a day, followed by the transfer of
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international I aw" and was not the type of
egregious human rights violation that the
Alien Tort Statute was intended to cover,
Justice David H. Souter wrote for the court.
But the specific fate of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain's lawsuit was not what made this
case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, No 03-339,
one of the most closely watched on the
court's docket. What mattered for future
cases was the court's broader interpretation
of the statute.
The Bush administration had urged the court
to hear the case and to rule that the Alien
Tort Statute did nothing more than define an
aspect of the federal courts' original
jurisdiction, without conferring an ability to
bring private lawsuits or to invoke modern
notions of international law.
There was "no basis," the administration's
brief said, to view the law as having
established "a roaming cause of action that
permits aliens to come to United States
courts and recover money damages for
violations of international law anywhere
around the globe." Congress had to
specifically provide a basis for suing under
the law, the brief said.
Justice Souter's majority opinion rejected
that argument. He said that while the law
should be applied with "judicial caution," it
should also be interpreted as its authors
intended it. He said the First Congress,
"which reflected the understanding of the
framing generation and included some of the
framers, assumed that federal courts could
properly identify some international norms
as enforceable" under the law it wrote. "It
would take some explaining to say now that
federal courts must avert their gaze entirely
from any international norm intended to
protect individuals," he added.
Justice Souter said that in the 18th century,
there were three offenses that were seen as
violating the contemporary concept of
international I aw: violation ofa promise to
give "safe conduct," piracy and
"infringement of the rights of
ambassadors." Calling these offenses
"paradigms," he said that the Alien Tort
Statute should be interpreted today as
applying to their modern equivalents:
international norms with "definite content
and acceptance among civilized nations."
Human rights lawyers said Tuesday that
while this analysis did not extend to the brief
detention of Dr. Alvarez-Machain, it would
cover universally recognized violations like
torture, genocide, slavery and prolonged
arbitrary detention.
"These are core human rights claims," Paul
L. Hoffman, who argued in the court for Dr.
Alvarez-Machain and who also represents
the plaintiffs in the Unocal lawsuit, said in
an interview. ''The court has accepted that
international law evolves and that this law
has contemporary meaning."
Dissenting from this portion of the opinion,
Justice Antonin Scalia said the majority had
adopted "a 20th-century invention of
internationalist law professors and human-
rights advocates" and opened the door to an
"illegitimate lawmaking endeavor" by
federal judges.
"American law - the law made by the
people's democratically elected
representatives - does not recognize a
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category of activity that is so universally
disapproved by other nations that it is
automatically unlawful here, and
automatically gives rise to a private action
for money damages in federal court,"
Justice Scalia said. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas
signed his opinion.
Echoing that criticism, Robin Conrad, a
lawyer with the United States Chamber of
Commerce, expressed the disappointment of
international business interests with the
decision. In an interview, she said the ruling
"leaves far too much discretion to courts"
and creates "an ever-expanding universe of
judge-made law." Ms. Conrad added: "We
didn't succeed in cutting these cases off at
the pass. We're back to square one."
Justice Souter's densely worded, 45-page
opinion contained numerous words of
caution for lower courts in handling future
cases. He said courts should be sensitive to
the foreign policy implications of cases
under the Alien Tort Statute, citing in
particular cases now pending against
corporations that cooperated with the
apartheid regime in South Africa.
The South African government has opposed
these lawsuits on the ground that they
interfere with its own post-apartheid
approach to reconciliation and
reconstruction, and the State Department has
endorsed South Africa's view. "In such
cases, there is a strong argument that federal
courts should give serious weight to the
executive branch's view of the case's impact
on foreign policy," Justice Souter said.
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The Court of Last Resort
The New York Times
August 7, 2003
Arlen Specter
The events of 9/11, as well as the war in
Iraq, require our government to intensify its
efforts to combat terrorism. So. it is more
important than ever that we do our utmost to
show the world that we will enforce human
rights laws evenhandedly.
Fortunately, the United States already has
the tools to lead by example. The Alien Tort
Claims Act, passed in 1789 by the first
Congress, allows aliens - that is, people who
are not citizens of the United States - to sue
in federal court for a "violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."
More than two centuries later, in 1992, the
Torture Victim Protection Act became law.
This 1 aw creates a right for victims - even
aliens - of state-sponsored torture and
summary execution in other countries to sue
in federal court here.
Despite this history, the Justice Department
has decided to contest the application of
these laws by federal courts to human rights
violations. Protecting human rights through
litigation, according to the administration,
might disrupt relations with some of our
allies. In a pending federal case involving
slave labor in Burma, the Justice
Department argued that this and similar
lawsuits may complicate foreign policy by
angering nations helping fight terrorism.
In 1992, the Justice Department made a
similar argument. Congress considered and
rejected it, as did President George H. W.
Bush. Both the president and Congress
recognized that suits brought under these
laws will not be successful against sitting
governments and leaders who have
immunity. They will bear fruit only when
used against former leaders and corporations
that have violated fundamental human rights
laws recognized since the trials of
Nuremberg.
These two laws cover only the most extreme
violations of international law. The Alien
Tort Claims Act has been interpreted to
apply only to genocide, war crimes, piracy,
slavery, torture, unlawful detention and
summary execution. The Torture Victims
Protection Act is limited to torture and
summary execution. There is no room for
moral relativism.
American credibility in the war on terrorism
depends on a strong stand against all
terrorist a cts, whether committed b y f oe or
friend. Our credibility in the war on
terrorism is only advanced when our
government enforces laws that protect
innocent victims. We then send the right
message to the world: the United States is
serious about human rights.
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Playing the Security Card
The Nation
July 5, 2004
David Cole
To all the arguments lodged against gay
marriage, add this one-it's a matter of
national security. So argued a woman
interviewed recently by NPR at the National
Association of Evangelicals convention in
Colorado Springs. Her reasoning: By
breaking down the family, we're not having
enough kids, while "other countries" with an
agenda to hurt America are having boatloads
of babies. If we legalize gay marriage, the
terrorists will eventually outnumber us. One
might be tempted to dismiss this as a
desperate rant if it weren't so close to
arguments the Bush Administration itself
has been making. As the election campaign
gets under way, national security has
become the ultimate all-purpose trump card.
The Bush crowd will play it anywhere.
Consider Attorney General John Ashcroft's
justification for a ruling last year that all
Haitians seeking refuge here should be
detained. In Ashcroft's view, national
security warranted locking them all up, not
because any of them posed a threat to
national security but because detaining them
all would deter other Haitians from seeking
refuge here, and that would save money that
could then be deployed elsewhere to protect
our national security. On this theory, any
initiative that reduces government
expenditures-from welfare reform to cutting
spending on environmental protection is
warranted by national security, because
those funds can then be used to fight
terrorism.
More recently, the Administration has
invoked national security in appealing a
landmark human rights case to the Supreme
Court. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
Administration contends that court
enforcement of human rights protections
might cramp its style as it fights for our
security. The case involves a 1789 statute,
the Alien Tort Claims Act, that human rights
victims have used to hold perpetrators liable
for their crimes against humanity. The law is
a beacon in the human rights field because it
provides a critical vehicle for developing
and enforcing human rights law in
individual cases.
This time, however, the case implicates
human rights violations by the United
States. The case challenges the abduction
and kidnapping ofa Mexican doctor att he
behest of Drug Enforcement Administration
officials to stand trial here for alleged
complicity in the killing of a DEA agent in
Mexico. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was acquitted
at his criminal trial, then turned around and
sued his abductors, obtaining a judgment
against them for international human rights
violations in his cross-border abduction.
Urging the Supreme Court to overturn the
judgment, the Bush Administration has
again played the national security card,
arguing that if federal courts enforce
international human rights norms, their
decisions might interfere with the
government's prerogatives in the war on
terror. But of course the whole point of
international law is to limit the prerogatives
of nations, at least when it comes to
fundamental rights owed to all persons.
The most recent development along these
lines is a Congressional resolution
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introduced by Republican Representative
Tom Feeney, maintaining that the Supreme
Court should not look to foreign law at all,
much less human rights law, in deciding
constitutional cases. The resolution was
apparently prompted by recent Supreme
Court decisions, including last year's ruling
invalidating sodomy laws, that have looked
to other countries' judicial decisions for
guidance in resolving similar disputes here.
It is commonplace in many countries to
consider the decisions of other nations'
courts, but it is apparently anathema to those
who contend that we can and should write
our own rules, regardless of what the rest of
the world thinks. It is no coincidence that
the resolution has surfaced at a time when
the Supreme Court is about to address the
detentions at Guantanamo Bay, a practice
that many foreign and international legal
experts have condemned as lawless.
The irony is that when we lock up people
without evidence that they are dangerous,
treat human rights as mere obstacles to our
political prerogatives and dismiss other
nations' laws and decisions as entirely
irrelevant to our resolution of fundamental
issues ofjustice, we make ourselves less, not
more, secure. A Pew Charitable Trust poll
recently found that anti-Americanism is at
an all-time high around the world. Much of
* the resentment stems from our claim that we
can bypass any principle of international law
that we deem inconvenient.
In the long run, it is this rising tide of anti-
Americanism that poses the greatest threat to
our security. The true path to safety lies in
respect for human rights and the views and
experiences of others, not in asserting, in the
name of national security, unilateral
authority to be a law unto ourselves.
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Justices Open Door With Alien Tort Case;
What Kind of Claims Remain is Contested
National Law Journal
July 5, 2004
Marcia Coyle
In the wake of a recent U.S. Supreme Court
ruling, big business and human rights groups
are preparing to battle over just how wide
the door remains open to federal court suits
by aliens with foreign human rights claims.
They disagree that last week's decision
requires dismissal of recent pending suits
against corporations, such as one against oil
giant Unocal for alleged slavery, rapes and
murder in the construction of a pipeline in
Myanmar.
But they agree that the justices painted a
"big bull's eye" on a suit in New York
against corporations for alleged abuses
during the apartheid regime in South Africa.
"If there are very specific and limited
circumstances where international law has
been violated, there may be appropriate
instances where those claims can be
adjudicated," said Daniel M. Petrocelli of
O'Melveny & Myers, who filed an amicus
brief on behalf of the National Foreign
Trade Council and other corporate interests
in the high court case.
"These are not the sort of claims that have
been brought against American companies
and certainly not claims brought against
Unocal," he insisted.
"I'm not sure either side really knows that,"
said human rights litigator Paul L. Hoffman
of Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris &
Hoffman of Venice, Calif. "I think what the
court is saying is they are only opening the
door to claims that have very solid support
in international law," he added. "Our
corporate claims do have that and deal with
very serious human rights violations."
Hoffman represented Humberto Alvarez-
Machain in the high court case, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, No. 03-339, and U.S. v.
Alvarez-Machain, No. 03-485. The justices
were asked whether Alvarez-Machain could
recover damages against the United States
and Mexican national Jose Sosa under the
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Alien Tort
Statute [ATS] for his kidnapping from
Mexico by Sosa and others at the instigation
of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Alvarez-Machain was brought to the United
States and acquitted in a criminal trial of
charges that he assisted in the torture and
murder of a DEA agent.
Although the case had nothing to do with
corporations, it galvanized the business
community, which has been up in arms over
the spate o f 1 awsuits under t he A TS i nt he
last decade charging corporations with
human rights violations committed abroad.
The high court denied relief to Alvarez-
Machain under both statutes. But the court
also rejected arguments by business and the
Bush administration that any claim for relief
under the ATS, a jurisdictional statute only,
requires a separate statute by Congress
expressly authorizing a cause of action.
International law scholars and others say
Hoffman and his supporters lost the battle
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but won the war in the Alvarez-Machain
case. Whether that is true will be learned as
pending cases unfold.
Last week, the high court in its decision
allowing Guantanamo Bay detainees access
to federal courts on their habeas challenges
said those courts also had jurisdiction to
hear their claims under the ATS.
And the Center for Constitutional Rights,
whose litigation more than 20 years ago
awakened the long-dormant Alien Tort
Statute, recently filed an ATS suit in
California on behalf of former prisoners at
Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison against two
corporations that provided interrogation and
language services at the prison.
"They discovered the planet Pluto by seeing
strange aberrations in the orbits of other
planets around Pluto," said international law
scholar William Casto of Texas Tech
University School of Law, whose writings
were cited by the court in Alvarez-Machain.
"I think t here's a Pluto in t his o pinion a nd
obviously it's the war on terrorism."
The ATS, also known as the Alien Tort
Claims Act, originally appeared in Section 9
of the first Judiciary Act of 1789, which
created the U.S. judicial court system. The
statute provides that "the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States."
The act was largely dormant until 1982,
when the 2d U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.
Represented by lawyers at the Center for
Constitutional Rights, Dolly Filartiga filed a
civil suit under the ATS against her
brother's murderer, the former Inspector
General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay,
seeking compensatory and punitive
damages. Her lawyers argued that just as
piracy was a violation of the law of nations
when the ATS was enacted, torture was a
crime against the law of nations in 1979.
The 2d Circuit agreed.
Since then, there have been three waves of
alien tort litigation: Filartiga-type cases-
torture, killing or disappearance abroad
committed by one alien against another
alien; suits against U.S. corporations and
some foreign corporations for participating
in human rights abuses abroad; and suits
against U.S. government officials or those
acting at their direction, a wave that now
includes the Abu Ghraib abuse litigation.
In the high court last week, Justice David H.
Souter, writing for a 6-3 court, carefully
examined the history, cases and other legal
materials surrounding the ATS. He rejected
the government's "stillborn" argument about
the ATS.
He said that "there is every reason" to
suppose that the first Congress did not pass
the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience "to
be placed on the shelf' for the future when a
Congress might authorize the creation of
causes of action.
History, he added, indicates that the ATS
furnished jurisdiction for a relatively modest
set of actions alleging violations of the law
of nations, such as assaults on ambassadors,
violations of safe conduct and piracy. In the
last two centuries, Souter said, Congress has
done nothing to preclude federal courts from
recognizing a claim under the law of
nations.
"Accordingly, we think courts should
require any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of
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international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the
18th Century paradigms we have
recognized," he held.
Souter also directed that courts be extremely
cautious in recognizing new causes of
action, that they consider whether a claimant
has exhausted any remedies available in the
domestic legal system, and give serious
weight to the executive branch's view of the
impact on foreign policy. The latter factor,
he noted, was particularly relevant in the
litigation, In re South African Apartheid
Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 [J.P.M.L.
2002], where both the U.S. and South
African governments have said the litigation
interferes with domestic and foreign policy.
Causes of action
The court's ruling was the first substantive
high court decision on the ATS in the
statute's history, said international law
scholar William Aceves of California
Western School of Law. "I think there are
going to be a subset of international claims
that are universal and that are well defined,"
he said. "When you begin to focus on these
very narrow claims, you can readily identify
them-genocide, torture, summary execution,
slavery."
Human rights activists, he predicted, will not
disregard the high court's concern about the
foreign policy implications of this litigation,
which could doom ATS claims filed by
Guantanamo detainees. But, he added,
courts should balance that concern with the
reality that Congress has spoken and
believes these lawsuits should proceed.
Aceves noted that the Bush administration
has increased the number of occasions
where the government has intervened in
ATS litigation. And, he added, the
administration has intervened almost
exclusively on behalf of multinational
corporations.
O'Melveny's Petrocelli said he expects
many of the ATS cases against corporations
to be dismissed as a result of the high court
ruling. In Unocal, for example, which is
pending in the 9th Circuit, he said plaintiffs
are trying to hold the corporation vicariously
liable for actions by Burmese soldiers
guarding the pipeline construction against
Burmese residents. Those are local claims,
he said.
Paul Kamenar of the Washington Legal
Foundation agreed, adding that the high
court decision "would certainly take care of
Unocal and cases like it where you have this
third-party liability tort action so attenuated
it would not be recognized at federal
common law."
Many of the suits against corporations
involve claims of violations of international
law and could subject government o fficials
to liability under the statute, said Casto.
"The real issue is not whether there is a
cause of action against the government or
individual officers, but whether we are
going to create a cause of action for
conspiracy or aiding and abetting that would
bring in U.S. corporations," he said, adding
that only English-speaking countries
recognize the conspiracy theory.
But Hoffman said, "There's no reason to
believe vicarious liability claims or
complicity claims will not succeed. Claims
against industrialists go back as far as
Nuremberg."
Casto and others believe the justices had the
war on terror clearly in mind as they decided
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the ATS case. In rejecting Alvarez-
Machain's ATS claim for arbitrary arrest,
said Casto, how could the justices not be
thinking of a possible kidnapping by the
United States of Osama bin Laden in a
foreign country and the arrival of enemies of
the U.S. in the federal courts to sue
American officials?
And in allowing the courthouse doors to
remain open to some ATS claims, he added,
certainly the justices had the Abu Ghraib
situation on their minds and the Department
of Justice's torture memo.
"Do we give the president carte blanche
when this is the sort of advice he is
receiving from his lawyers, when we know
there are instances of beatings and even
death?" Casto said the justices may have
thought. "They don't want the president to
feel there is no possibility of judicial
review."
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